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In this chapter I argue that teaching, as we now understand the term, is historically and cross-
culturally very rare.  It appears to be unnecessary to transmit culture or to socialize children. 
Children are, on the other hand, primed by evolution to be avid observers, imitators, players and 
helpers—roles that reveal the profoundly autonomous and self-directed nature of culture 
acquisition (Lancy in press a). And yet, teaching is ubiquitous throughout the modern world—at 
least among the middle to upper class segment of the population. This ubiquity has led numerous 
scholars to argue for the universality and uniqueness of teaching as a characteristically human 
behavior. The theme of this chapter is that this proposition is unsustainable. Teaching is largely a 
result of recent cultural changes and the emergence of modern economies, not evolution.  




An important part of the common lore of anthropology is that “other people have culture.” That 
is, most people fail to recognize or appreciate how much of their lives are governed by habits, 
values, and expectations that are largely the product of history and culture. They fail to 
acknowledge that their own way of doing things is not necessarily universal or even widely 
shared. This ethnocentrism can have enormous consequences for the construction of child 
development theory and education. In fact, as Henrich, Heine, and Norenzayan (2010) have so 
brilliantly demonstrated, much of what we consider “human” psychology comes from facsimile, 
lab research carried out with U.S. undergraduates—members of WEIRD (Western, Educated, 
Industrialized, Rich, Democratic) society.  They question “whether researchers can reasonably 
generalize from WEIRD samples to humanity at large” (Henrich et al., 2010, 62). In fact, 
“WEIRD people are the outliers in so many key domains of the behavioral sciences; [they are] 
one of the worst subpopulations one could study for generalizing about Homo sapiens” (Henrich 
et al. 2010: 79). 
While Henrich et al.’s (2010) identification of this problem—the tendency to 
overgeneralize results from WEIRD samples to the species—is quite thorough, theirs is only the 
latest in a very long history of such challenges. Anthropologists have been particularly critical of 
many “established” principles in human behavior studies. This happens so often that LeVine 
coined the expression the “anthropologists veto” (LeVine, 2007; see also Fouts, 2005). He has 
forcibly exercised this veto in his critique of the Bowlby and Ainsworth theory of infant 
attachment. LeVine’s observations of agrarian, East African Gusii parents suggest the possibility 
of weak attachment and consequent blighted development. He found that while mothers respond 
promptly to their infant’s distress signals, they ignore other vocalizations such as babbling. They 
rarely look at their infants or speak to them—even while breastfeeding. Later, when they do 
address their children, they use commands and threats rather than praise or interrogatives 




(LeVine, 2004; LeVine, 2014). In spite of these obvious signs of “deficiency” on the part of 
Gusii mothers, LeVine and his colleagues—who have been studying Gusii villagers for 
decades—find no evidence of widespread emotional crippling.  
Researchers in the behavioral sciences are often vulnerable to the anthropologist’s veto. 
As noted earlier, we are largely unaware of our own culture unless we make it a practice to step 
outside our own ethnocentric biases. Generalizations about behavior observed in the dominant 
WEIRD society—especially when validated through lab research—are treated as “natural,” the 
product of nature rather than nurture (Lancy, 2010a). This seems to be particularly true for infant 
studies where there is an assumption that the infant resides in a bubble that is as yet impervious 
to cultural influence (but see Bjorkland, 2007, for a critique).  As Hunt notes: “Until the 
necessary cross-cultural research has been done, we have to admit the possibility that [observed 
patterns of behavior] are the result of experiences that are specific either to American and 
perhaps other post-industrial societies” (Hunt, 2007, p. 145). However, behavioral scientists 
rarely test the universality of their findings via a survey of the relevant ethnographic literature. 
For example, a recent lab study made the unqualified claim that “…early pretend play 
is…heavily scaffolded by adults (Rakoczy et al., 2005, p. 70)”—in spite of a near total absence 
of any reference to parent-child pretend play in the ethnographic or historic records (Lancy, 
2007)2. In a representative cross-cultural study, the investigators invited rural village mothers 
and their educated, urban counterparts to “scaffold” their child’s introduction to toys donated by 
the researchers.  
[Village] caregivers appeared to interpret activities such as exploring novel 
objects, as an appropriate context for children to play with the objects 
                                            
2 In Peter Breughel’s 1560 masterpiece “Children’s Games” in the Kunsthistoriches Museum, Vienna, he portrays, 
in one canvas, eighty-four distinct children’s “pass-times” or games. In none is an adult shown as a participant. 




independently, not as a context for adult-child interaction or play. Thus, 
caregivers would let the child play independently when the novel objects were 
presented, while they returned to their chores. However, [WEIRD] parents…did 
not see the [request] for joint play with their toddlers as inappropriate (Göncü et 
al., 2000, p. 322). 
Natural Pedagogy? 
Parent-child teaching is another behavioral practice characteristic of WEIRD child-rearing that 
has recently been elevated to evolved, universal, or “natural” status. In the remainder of this 
paper I will interrogate this claim. 
The lines in this debate are very clearly drawn (Bonawitz et al., 2011). On the one hand 
are scholars who argue that for successful child development and reliable transmission of culture 
from generation to generation, parents must teach their children skills and knowledge essential to 
survival and successful adaptation (Kline 2015). A typical expression of this belief: 
Teaching is recognized as a universal human activity and has received much 
attention …reflecting…the centrality of adult teaching in educating children and 
in enhancing their cognitive development (Strauss & Ziv, 2004, p. 
451).…teaching may be a natural cognition (Strauss & Ziv, 2004, p. 455).… all 
know how to teach (Strauss et al., 2002, p. 1477). 
But anthropologists see a very different picture. “If selection favours teaching because it 
is necessary to promote learning of critical skills, it should be common within populations” 
(Thornton & McAuliffe, 2012, e8). On the contrary, cultural anthropologists and primatologists 
studying juveniles often draw marked attention in their ethnographic/field accounts to the almost 




total absence of teaching of juveniles by their parents or others3.  Here is a sampling of 
anthropologists’ and historians’ view of the role of teaching: 
The ability to learn is older—as it is also more widespread—than is the ability to teach 
(Mead 1964, p. 44).everyday activity…is a more powerful source of socialization than 
intentional pedagogy (Lave 1988, p. 14). 
The equation, implicit in Vygotsky’s work, of culturally transmitted knowledge 
learned through instruction is ethnocentrically biased. In most human societies, 
children become competent adults without the help of….teaching…Most learning 
is achieved as a by-product, in the course of interactions that have other purposes 
(Atran & Sperber, 1991, p. 39). 
 
The specialized cognitive skills of children that underlie their innate ability to 
learn (as opposed to adults’ more conscious and less reliable ability to teach) 
establishes the success of cultural reproduction as the child’s achievement 
(Langdon, 2013, p. 174). 
 As Premack and Premack (2012) note:  “The anthropology of pedagogy is largely nonexistent” 
(p. 315). I have conducted four successive reviews of this literature, each incorporating a greater 
number of cases (Lancy, 1996, 2008), the latest extending to the historic record (Lancy 2010, 
2014a). In each review, the conclusions were that teaching was extremely rare and did not seem 
to map onto any inventory of critical survival skills. In parental ethnotheories of “proper” child-
rearing, teaching was specifically proscribed—even deemed harmful. Table 1 represents a very 
small sample of the cases that illustrate these points. 
                                            
3 In another paper (Lancy in press a) I take up the question of why evolution might favor social learning over 
teaching in cultural transmission. 




 In the model embraced by contemporary child psychologists, parents, and educators, the 
learning and development process is dominated by a top-down transfer of knowledge (teaching) 
from experts/teachers to novices/pupils. By contrast, the ethnographic record portrays the 
development of skill and knowledge as largely a bottom-up process where the eager, self-
initiating learner takes advantage of social learning opportunities to replicate (often initially in 
play) the observed skills and behaviors practiced by members of his/her family (Bloch et al., 
2001) and community (Lancy, in press a, b). Geary (2007) has developed an extremely useful 
theory that provides a firm evolutionary foundation for the top-down, bottom-up distinction. In 
his theory, evolution has afforded children panoply of cognitive skills and the motivation to 
master “evolutionary-significant content areas.”   These culture acquisition tools (e.g. bottom-up) 
are adapted for mastering “biologically primary domains” such as language and the ability to 
decode and learn from the natural environment (see, for example, Zarger, 2002) On the other 
hand, “academic learning involves…a suite of culture-specific, biologically secondary domains, 
such as mathematics” (Geary 2007, p. 5). To “survive” in post-industrial society, individuals 
must learn material that nature has not endowed them with the ability to learn on their own 
initiative. To learn mathematics you must be taught—in a top-down process. For example, the 
Roman philosopher Quintillian asserts “it is quite clear the young student lacks the judgment to 
understand…what is set for him.” (Langdon, 2013, p. 457). 
As leaders in the “teaching is essential” contingent, Csibra, Gergely and associates go 
well beyond the claim that teaching is universal and argue that it is part of an evolved 
psychology unique to humans: “…[teaching or] natural pedagogy is a basic cognitive hominin 
adaptation” (Csibra & Gergely, 2009, p. 149). “Natural pedagogy was an independently selected 
adaptive cognitive system [rather] than…a by-product of some other human-specific adaptation, 
such as language” (Csibra & Gergely, 2011, p. 1149). Tomasello and colleagues also claim that 




only humans have evolved the capacity for teaching because “…human beings, and only human 
beings, are biologically adapted for participating in collaborative activities involving shared 
goals and socially coordinated action plans” (Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne, & Moll, 2005, 
p. 674). Those who do field studies with great apes, on the contrary, find ample evidence for 
collaborative activities (hunting, for example, Boesch, 2005). Matasuzawa and colleagues 
describe the process whereby chimpanzee mothers facilitate their child’s persistent imitation of 
her skilled nut cracking, including providing free access to shelled nuts and the hammer and 
anvil stone tool kit (Matasuzawa et al., 2001). In fact, it is striking how similar human’s 
facilitation of children’s attempts to learn tool use is to chimpanzee practice (Humle and 
Newton-Fisher 2013; Lancy, in press b). Hatano and Takahashi (2005) provide the following 
summation of this body of work: 
Our speculation is that there is only a small, quantitative difference in many basic 
aspects (including sharing, intentionality) between humans and great apes, but the 
aggregate of a number of these small differences produces the remarkable 
qualitative difference [between apes and humans] (Hatano and Takahashi 2005: 
703). 
Ethnocentrism as an Impediment to Theory Construction 
I have already noted the tendency to consider the practices of our own culture as “normal” or 
“natural.” Two cases can be cited where an ethnocentric perspective seriously undermines claims 
for the ubiquity of teaching. In constructing an argument about the genesis of teaching in the 
(universal) parent-infant relationship, Tomasello and colleagues offer this exemplar: “suppose a 
child and adult are building a block tower together” (Tomasello et al. 2005, p. 682). Nowhere in 
the entire ethnographic record of childhood have I found any instance of a parent and child 
building a block tower (or anything else) together; the purpose being to entertain while also 




instructing the child in some critical-to-the-culture skill (see Callaghan et al., 2011). Such 
behavior would fly in the face of widespread, core beliefs about parent-child relationships.  To 
take a typical case, Sisala “parents regard an interest in children’s play as beneath their dignity” 
(Grindal, 1972, p. 25). Once this ethnocentrism has been recognized and the research group has 
incorporated cross-cultural material in their analysis, the contrast becomes obvious. 
…due to a child-rearing philosophy focused heavily on pedagogy—parents in 
many Western, industrialized societies quite naturally interact with their young 
children in these ways, whereas parents in more traditional, small-scale societies 
do so much less often. The comprehension and use of pretense and graphic 
symbols therefore, is something that would seem to be quite dependent—
especially in terms of early emergence—on the ways that children in different 
cultural settings experience these symbols (Callaghan et al., 2011, p. 109; see also 
Kärtner et al., 2008). 
 
Schooling provides a powerful model of the way information can be transmitted 
via language…So, we can expect more-educated parents to engage in more 
conversation, especially pedagogic and explanatory conversation, with their 
children… (Harris, 2012, p.  34). 
 
As noted above, WEIRD society places an extremely high premium on the early 
development of academic knowledge and a high degree of literacy. One example of this truly 
urgent imperative can be found in the enormous popularity of “Baby Signs,” a system of using 
ASL (American Sign Language) to accelerate the infant’s use of language (see also Bjorklund & 
Beers, this volume). A typical testimonial to this innovation cheers “Hurray for Baby 




Signs!...Considering how slowly babies learn even easy words like ball and doggy, let alone 
difficult words like scared or elephant, many months are lost that could be spent having rich and 
rewarding interactions, both for the child and the parent” (Acredolo & Goodwyn, 2002, p. 3).  
Other examples come from a growing body of research in WEIRD society that reveals 
parents “teaching” children skills that they can readily learn on their own and have always done 
so (Shneidman & Goldin-Meadow 2012). Prominent examples include: teaching children to 
speak (Clark, 2005); teaching them how to do make-believe (Vandermaas-Peeler Nelson, von der 
Heide, & Kelly, 2009); teaching them how play with peers (Schütze, Kreppner, & Paulsen, 1986; 
Waldfogel, 2006) and; teaching them how to play with toys. In another line of research, middle 
class parents were asked to carry out a cooking exercise (making crispy treats) with their four-
six- and eight-year-old children. But WEIRD parents used the cooking activity as a pretext for 
teaching children about literacy and basic mathematical concepts and skills4. The parents’ overly 
didactic focus undermined children’s enthusiasm for the exercise (Finn & Vandermaas-Peeler, 
2013)5. Gergely and associates have developed one of the more elaborated arguments for the 
significance and evolved character of teaching. Their natural pedagogy theory derives from 
laboratory research on infant cognition and infant-parent interaction in middle-class Hungarian 
society.   
Humans are adapted to spontaneously transfer…fast and efficiently (Gergely et al,. 
2007, p. 145)… relevant cultural knowledge to conspecifics and to fast-learn the 
                                            
4 In a large-scale longitudinal study, the authors found that children attending heavily academic pre-school 
programs, had lower test scores in 3rd and 4th grade than those who had attended a more child-initiated, play-
centered programs (Marcom 2002).   
5 Fortunately, there is a growing “popular” movement to give children space to learn on their own without 
the constant mediation and supervision of a parent/ teacher/coach/child-minder (see, as examples, Gray 
2013; Honroe 2009; Sampson 2015; Skenazy 2009; Tulley and Spiegler 2011). 




contents of such teaching through a human-specific social learning system called 
“pedagogy.” Pedagogical knowledge transfer is triggered by specific 
communicative cues (such as eye-contact, contingent reactivity, the prosodic 
pattern of ‘motherese,’ and being addressed by one’s own name). Infants show 
special sensitivity to such ‘ostensive’ cues that signal the teacher’s 
communicative intention to manifest new and relevant knowledge about a referent 
object. Pedagogy offers a novel functional perspective to interpret a variety of 
early emerging triadic communicative interactions between adults and infants 
about novel objects they are jointly attending to (Gergely et al., 2007, p. 139). 
 
Again, a thorough reading of the ethnographic record would undermine their arguments. 
This collection of parent-infant interaction patterns is rare beyond WEIRD or post-industrial 
society, particularly when applied to fathers (Brazelton, 1977). In the many societies where 
infants are not held en face as a rule, but attached to the mother’s body or held facing away from 
the caretaker (e.g. Field & Widmayer, 1981; Jay, 1969; Ochs & Izquierdo, 2009), infants may be 
far “more attuned to their caregivers’ postural positions than to their caregivers’ gaze direction” 
(Akhtar & Gernsbacher, 2008, p. 61). Motherese and baby-talk are not found universally (Ochs, 
1986; Pye, 1991; Solomon, 2012). Pointing and interactive communication by the infant and 
parent are, according to Tomasello et al. (2005), the nascent signs of later, full-blown teaching. 
But, like other components of “natural pedagogy,” pointing by infants may be uncommon6, 
especially as others rarely respond to more than the child’s basic needs. In a systematic and 
focused study:  
                                            
6 Consider also that, in many societies, infants are swaddled or hidden away in cocoon-like containers, which 
restrict any sort of communication except distress. 




“pointing (in Tzeltal and Rossel)…does not have the canonical result observed in 
postindustrial societies, with the adult labeling the object pointed at…On the basis 
of these observations, it is hard to believe that indexical pointing per se is playing 
a critical role in the infants’ understanding that others have minds and 
communicative intentions of their own” (Brown, 2011, p. 48). 
 
In another recent study, middle and lower class mothers in Caracas and Chicago were 
recorded (90 minutes in total) during interaction with their 3 month-old infants. The amount of 
communication—verbal and gestural (e.g. pointing)—varied enormously from 0 (lower class 
Caracas) to 6000 (middle class Chicago) words directed at the infant. And this range was 
accounted for by the mother’s and grandmother’s education level. Those with more schooling 
showed greater awareness of “modern” socialization methods including the need to actively 
engage in “conversation” with the infant (Rowe, 2015). 
Mothers with little schooling or exposure to teaching don’t often engage cognitively with 
infants (Callaghan et al., 2011: 66; Kärtner et al., 2008). They respond quickly to their distress 
cues by nursing and soothing them. But they rarely gaze at them or engage in shared attention to 
novel objects (de León, 2011; Göncü, Mistry, & Mosier,  2000; LeVine, 2004). When Nso 
babies gaze at their mothers during nursing, the mother blows in their eyes so they avert their 
gaze and pay attention to others (Keller, 2013). Mazahua nursing mothers often display a 
“distracted air and pay almost no attention to the baby” (Paradise, 1996, p. 382). “Pashtu mothers 
rarely make eye-contact with their infants when nursing unless there’s a problem” (Casimir, 
2010, p. 22). In a comparative, quantitative analysis, “Euro-American adults were much more 
likely than Aka [foragers] or Ngandu [farmers] adults to stimulate (e.g., tickle) and vocalize to 
their infants (see also Whiten & Milner, 1984).  As a result, Euro-American infants were 




significantly more likely than Aka and Ngandu infants to smile, look at, and vocalize to their care 
providers” (Hewlett, Lamb, Leyendecker, & Schölmerich, 2000, p. 164). Akira Takada makes 
the point—based on his extensive observation of mother-infant interactions among Kalahari 
San—that the mother is engaged in a whirlwind of activity while holding or nursing her infant. 
This may include extensive verbal interactions with others. In short, she’s much too busy to gaze 
at the infant or attempt to engage it in a mutual activity (Takada, 2012; see also Meehan, 2009). 
The entire idea of stimulating infants cognitively and teaching them (“knowledge 
transfer”) is belied by practices like seclusion, swaddling, cradle-boards, and enveloping the 
child in a cloth attached to its mother’s (or sister’s) back. The most widely shared philosophy of 
infant care is to do everything possible to reduce stimulation so that the infant remains at rest 
(Howrigan, 1988). Chiga babies are kept quiet and not spoken to (Edel, 1957/1996), and 
traditional Chinese practice provides the infant “a tranquil and protective environment” (Bai, 
2005, p. 11).  Contemporary Dutch parents embrace a model of infancy in which plenty of sleep 
and restful, quiet waking periods is ideal. By contrast, US mothers are committed to keeping 
infants stimulated via physical contact, speech and toys (Harkness & Super, 2006). Like the rest 
of Gergely et al.’s communicative cues, “being addressed by one’s own name” (Gergely et al., 
2007, p. 139) carries little theoretical weight because, in most societies, infants don’t receive a 
distinctive name until their viability is assured and they are considered ready to “become persons” 
(Lancy 2014b). Keller and colleagues, based on extensive cross-cultural research, sum up the 
major difference in infant care between WEIRD society and others: “face-to-face contact is the 
most prominent system of parenting in urban educated middle-class families of Western societies” 
while elsewhere extensive bodily contact with little visual or verbal engagement is the rule 
(Keller, Borke, Lamm, Lohaus and Dzeaye Yovsi 2010,  p. 234). The contrasting patterns are 




designed to develop the child’s individuality and agency in the first case and self-regulation and 
conformity to group expectations, in the second. 
Lastly, there is little evidence in the ethnographic literature that adults feel any urgency to 
transfer knowledge to children “fast and efficiently.” In fact, the infant cognition studies which 
are the well-spring for Gergely and associates’ (2007) theory are far more congenial to child-
initiated acquisition of culture than adult-directed “transfer of cultural knowledge.”  For example, 
Gergely et al. conducted a study of 14-month-old infants ostensibly learning to execute a task 
from watching an adult model. But the infants don’t faithfully copy the demonstrator, only those 
actions which seem relevant to completing the task. “Our results indicate that imitation of goal-
directed action by preverbal infants is a selective, interpretative process, rather than a simple re-
enactment of the means used by a demonstrator, as was previously thought” (Gergely et al., 2002, 
p. 755). Even at 14 months, infants are out in front of would-be teachers, taking the initiative to 
learn (Lancy, in press a).  
Recent empirical studies by Rogoff and colleagues support this perspective. It would 
appear that children who must learn in and from the environment (as opposed to learning from 
teachers and books) develop characteristically different attention patterns (Gaskins & Paradise, 
2010; Rogoff, Correa-Chávez, & Cotuc, 2005). Village children, as well as immigrant children 
whose mothers have little schooling—invited to learn to make something (e.g. Origami 
figures)—rely on observing the task as it is carried out by an expert or attempted by other 
children. A sample of more “schooled” individuals, on the other hand, pay little attention to the 
demonstration, waiting for (or soliciting) a teacher’s explanation and verbal guidance (Correa-
Chavez  & Rogoff, 2005).   
Data and Definition Issues 




Even those who claim that teaching is ubiquitous and universal acknowledge that “…teaching is 
a slippery concept” (Strauss & Ziv, 2012, p. 187). I will review two studies in non-WEIRD 
societies that purportedly show evidence of parent-child instruction to illustrate this slipperiness.  
In an early study of the Aka—forest foragers from central Africa—using interview data, 
Hewlett and Cavalli-Sforza (1986) reported on the results of a survey (n = 72, ages seven to 
adult) asking who had taught respondents a list of 50 common skills. Eighty-one percent of 
respondents identified a parent as their teacher. However, the authors do not clearly differentiate 
between adult-directed, explicit, intentional teaching and more informal, learner-initiated 
observation of an older role model, or the kind of interactive skill learning that occurs during the 
participatory activity described by Lave, Rogoff and colleagues (Lave & Wenger, 1991; Rogoff 
et al.. 2005; Tehrani & Collard, 2009; Tehrani & Riede, 2008).  
In more recent reports of the same Aka community surveyed by Hewlett and Cavalli-
Sforza (1986), relying on ethnographic observation rather than interviews, Hewlett and 
colleagues (2011; Hewlett, 2013; Hewlett & Hewlett 2013) present evidence of how children 
learn, and from whom, that is more consistent with the ethnographic record as a whole. In a 
report drawing on two systematic observational studies, Boyette—using a very broad, inclusive 
definition of teaching—finds teaching to be quite rare among the Aka: “observed during about 
two percent of all minutes of observation in both 2008 and 2010” (Boyette, 2013, p. 91). 
In a comparable recent interview study conducted with 72 Fijian adults, the authors found 
that, depending on how the query was posed, teaching was seen as critical in the transmission of 
valued skills, 18 percent to 43 percent of the time (Kline, Boyd, & Henrich, 2013). But interview 
data are particularly vulnerable to response compliance. The villagers Kline queried had had over 
100 years’ exposure to Western schooling and missionary influence (Kline et al. 2013). In my 
fieldwork with Kpelle children in the early 1970s, where teaching was conspicuously absent, the 




village inaugurated its first school during my fieldwork. The Christian congregation was tiny and 
Muslims even rarer (Lancy, 1996). Little conducted a child-focused ethnography among the 
Asabano, a remote and unacculturated Papua New Guinea (PNG) Highlands tribe. Schools and 
churches had arrived within the previous 15-20 years. In his observation of children and parents, 
he saw no teaching. Parents displayed no obligation to encourage children’s learning; to manage 
their activity; or even to acknowledge, let alone reward, children’s efforts. However, when 
“asked how their children learn anything, [parents] unanimously answered that they explicitly 
‘show’ children in a step-by-step process, even though they very clearly did no such thing” 
(Little, 2011, p.  152). Probing further, Little discovered that the resolution to this contradiction 
lay in the consistent and explicit sermonizing of village pastors regarding the Christian duty of 
parents to instruct their children. Although parents had not actually changed their parenting 
behavior, they could parrot the credo and apply it to their own culture (Little, 2011). 
In summary, it is my recommendation that for a phenomenon as “slippery” as teaching, 
one would be on much firmer ground if the data were triangulated: ethnographic study to provide 
cultural and historical context and meaning (Odden, 2007; Little & Lancy, in prep.); systematic 
observation (e.g. Boyette, 2013); and informed, open-ended interviews with both experts and 
learners (Lancy, 1996). 
 
An equally challenging problem is the lack of consensus on a definition of what teaching 
(or pedagogy) is. Kline (2015, p. 1) notes “there is wide disagreement about how to define 
teaching, and how to interpret the empirical evidence for teaching across cultures and species.” 
She defines “teaching as behavior that evolved to facilitate learning in others” (emphasis in 
original). But this definition presumes the acceptance of a hypothesis that has yet to be tested. To 
do so, Kline must identify behaviors that facilitate learning in others; then determine that those 




behaviors are uniquely associated with teaching and not some other purpose(s); and lastly, 
establish that the behaviors are ubiquitous and critically important among humans, but absent in 
close relatives such as apes. But such is clearly not the case: “If teaching is defined very broadly 
to include any behavior of one animal that serves to assist another animal’s learning, teaching is 
relatively common in the animal kingdom” (Boesch & Tomasello 1998, p. 602). 
But Kline does not develop a stringent definition of teaching suitable for testing the 
theory that it has evolved separately from other behaviors that might assist learners. Instead she 
offers a very catholic and inclusive catalog of behaviors that she would count as fitting her 
definition of “teaching.” But, as other evolutionary scholars interested in teaching have noted: 
“We feel that moving away from a clearly delineated and testable definition risks creating 
confusion and eroding standards of evidence in this nascent field” (Thornton & McAuliffe, 2012, 
p. e7). I see enormous difficulties in unequivocally identifying the named behaviors as reflecting 
structures evolved to facilitate learning in others.  For example, one type of teaching behavior is 
opportunity provisioning where the “teacher” provides the child access to objects or settings 
from which they can learn (Kline 2015, p. 7).  This would include the frequent accounts of the 
provision of knives to young children. For example, a Pirahã child: 
 
was playing with a sharp knife … swinging the knife blade around him, often 
coming close to his eyes, his chest, his arm … when he dropped the knife, his 
mother–talking to someone else – reached backward nonchalantly … picked up 
the knife and handed it back to the toddler (Everett ,2008, p. 89). 
And from Taiwan: 
Parents were surprised and amused when questions such as ‘How do you teach 
children …’ were put to them. ‘We don’t teach them; why they just learn 




themselves,’ was the usual answer…A 2-year-old girl was seen imitating her 
mother by attempting to whittle off pieces of bamboo with a large 12-inch 
blade bushknife…Sickles and knives are used expertly by many 6-year-olds. 
Bandaged fingers and numerous little scars are evidences of learning and 
experimentation” (Maretzki and Maretzki 1963: 510-511). 
I would use these  examples of “opportunity provisioning” as prima facie evidence of 
parents’ aversion to teaching coupled with the widespread belief (Lancy, in press b) that learning 
how to use knives is children’s business (e.g., Willerslev, 2007). 
 
Evaluative feedback is another type of teaching discussed by Kline (2015, p. 8). A 
normative reading of the ethnographic record would stress the rarity of feedback—especially 
praise—from adults (Hilger, 1957; Metge, 1984). Even in the West, providing positive feedback 
or praise was, until fairly recently, rejected as a child-rearing or pedagogical technique because 
of the danger of “spoiling” the child (LeVine & Norman, 2001). Not surprisingly, in the bottom-
up model of culture acquisition that predominated until very recently, evaluative feedback is 
provided to the learner automatically during the learning process (Paradise 1998). The learner 
doesn’t need an adult to tell them whether or not they’re successful; the results of their efforts 
will provide all the feedback necessary. Indeed, one of the most important contemporary 
research programs in educational psychology has been the de-mythologizing of excessive teacher 
donated praise (Mueller & Dweck, 1998). On the other hand, corporal punishment (Ember & 
Ember, 2005; Hsiung, 2005) and frightening the child are certainly common instances of 
“evaluative feedback” (these commonly employed elements of “natural pedagogy” are 
conspicuously absent from the major evolutionary based theories, e.g. Kruger & Tomasello, 
1996). But of course, it isn’t clear that the intent is to teach.  Verbal and corporal punishment or 




denial of food is usually aimed at a child who has failed to do a chore or run an errand—tasks 
she/he has already mastered. “Evaluative feedback” is largely used to manage the child’s 
behavior, rather than to transmit the culture. 
In crafting a broad, inclusive definition of teaching, in order to counter the argument that 
teaching is rare and unlikely to play a role in human evolution, Kline (2013) makes it near 
impossible to differentiate teaching from other behaviors. This quandary is easily illustrated 
(Köhler, 2012). When a mother tolerates the presence of her 4-year-old daughter while sitting in 
the shade of her house working clay into pots, is she teaching (yes, according to Kline)? Or, is 
she “child minding?” When she donates a ball of clay to the daughter (without any verbal 
instruction), is she teaching (also yes in Kline’s theory)? Or, is she keeping the child occupied so 
she’ll not be a bother? If she donates a ball of clay to her sister who drops by, is she teaching or 
displaying reciprocal altruism?  Obviously, many behaviors displayed by one party can 
“facilitate learning” in another party. But crediting such behaviors as “teaching” is merely a 
hypothesis which is difficult, if not impossible, to support.  
To take another “slippery” example, the Aka may take their 10-12 month old infants 
along on net-hunting expeditions. A mother will assemble, in a basket, a miniature or toy tool kit 
(axes, digging sticks, spears). When the hunting party stops to rest, the mother empties the basket 
of tools whose contents keep the toddler happily chopping, cutting and, digging. This activity 
distracts the child, lessens the likelihood he’ll wander off into the bush, and is patently 
entertaining for the adults. It reflects an understanding of children’s deep interest in objects, their 
desire to achieve greater competence using them, and also reflects an Aka “core cultural 
value”—respect of the child’s autonomy (Hewlett & Hewlett 2013). Although this seems the 
most straight-forward rationale for the mother’s tool/toy basket, the authors claim a pedagogical 
intent on the part of parents. But these are 10-12-month-olds—hardly the most propitious age for 




beginning “training” in the use of tools. Further, they report no evidence that the occasional on-
the-spot teaching is part of a program of systematic instruction in which the parent takes 
responsibility for developing the child’s mastery of tool use (Hewlett et al. 2011).  
A Working Definition of Teaching 
I believe that a definition of teaching that is robust enough to survive the rigors of evolutionary 
theory must meet the criteria noted in Table 2. For most of the village curriculum, children are 
capable of learning socially or individually. They do not require the services of a teacher. Even 
when they seek the assistance of a teacher, they may well be rebuffed if the expert feels that this 
is unnecessary (they’ll learn on their own) or a waste of his/her time (Lancy, in press b). That is, 
teaching incurs costs to the teacher. These costs must be offset by clear fitness gains for the 
teacher; most obviously that the lesson is critical to the child (or other close kin) learning skills 
which are vital to survival and eventual reproduction.  The teacher may also increase his/her 
fitness directly—a successful lesson will increase the child’s work output, unburdening the 
parent/teacher—or indirectly, where the skills taught will lead to some future surplus output that 
can be donated to the teacher.  We can imagine any number of hypothetical scenarios that would 
meet these criteria. However, in the real world, the necessity for teaching is mediated by the 
child’s ability to learn without the aid of a teacher. We have overwhelming evidence from both 
field and laboratory studies that children are self-starters, getting about the business of learning 
critical skills without the intervention of a teacher (Geary, 1995); and parallel evidence of deep-
seated pro-social tendencies which compel them to apply their newly learned skills in the service 
of family (Haun, et al. 2013). Why should an expert invest time, materials, and energy 
instructing a novice who will learn just fine on her own and likely enhance relative fitness in the 
long term (Trivers, 1972)?   




Criterion three and four in Table 2 point to the necessity of finding signs that a “lesson” 
is underway. Without these indicators, as I’ve mentioned earlier, it is nigh impossible to 
distinguish a behavior or suite of behaviors as teaching, rather than altruism, punishment, child-
minding, and so on (Thornton & Raihani, 2008). If you argue for the survival value of the skills 
or information being taught, and you argue that they are opaque and can’t be learned without 
teaching (Csibra & Gergely, 2011), then there should be lessons. That is, you should see/hear a 
parent say something like, “I will now teach Goma to make traps; he is ready to learn it.” It 
should be obvious to an observer that a lesson is underway. One should see demonstration, 
verbal explanation, and correction.  There should be decision rules, re: when to change teaching 
tactics to get Goma over any obstacles, or when to stop and declare him trained. You can’t claim 
that teaching is ephemeral, fleeting and casual, that it is not matched up in any specific ways 
with the developing child and the local skill set while also claiming that culture and individuals 
would not survive without it (Csibra & Gergely, 2011). If a baby isn’t fed, it dies. Csibra and 
Gergely’s assertions re: teaching MUST be supported by life or death examples.  
 
Teaching in the Village 
To this point, the reader may well assume that I am arguing that teaching does not exist outside 
WEIRD society. On the contrary, it certainly does exist and I will discuss these specific cases in 
this section. My argument rather is that the extreme rarity of teaching, its seemingly random 
variety and distribution, and the very evident aversion to and disapproval of teaching in most 
situations, fatally weakens arguments for the ubiquity, importance and evolutionarily shaped 
nature of teaching. In actuality, when we seek out instances of teaching, we see situations 
suggestive of Lévi-Srauss’ (1966) famed bricoleur. 




In the ethnographic record, teaching tends to cluster around certain bodies of knowledge 
and skill. In a handful of societies infants are “taught” to sit and/or walk. The purpose is clearly 
not to ensure that children will master sitting and walking—they’ll obviously learn on their own 
eventually. But, in high fertility societies, the infant’s independence and separation from its 
mother is accelerated via early weaning from the breast and the back, and accelerated walking to 
free up the mother to attend to the next birth. According to the definition outlined earlier, these 
examples can’t be classified as teaching because the child can learn entirely on their own, so I 
have chosen to characterize this behavior as “acceleration” rather than teaching (Lancy, 2014).   
I have characterized a second cluster of behaviors as “learning manners.” Extremely 
common in Oceania (Lancy, 2014)—but much rarer elsewhere—we find families systematically 
teaching the skills needed for full acceptance as a human being—a “true” Tongan, for example. 
That is, most societies differentiate between not-fully-human infants and children who are 
considered human (but still of little importance). In the Pacific Islands, issues of rank, speech, 
and etiquette are so important that families feel that their not-fully-human children are a source 
of embarrassment and loss of status (Fajans, 1997). To remedy these deficits, lessons are 
constructed (and administered by all family members from about age five) to teach polite speech, 
appropriate terms of address, and social etiquette.  
A limited number of societies intervene early to promote sharing (Lancy, 2014). For 
example, Papel infants are given something desirable, such as a snack, then immediately told to 
pass it on to another, particularly a sibling (Einarsdóttir, 2004). Generosity is demanded of even 
small Ngoni children both directly—forcing them to donate prized resources to peers—and 
indirectly, through proverbs lauding generosity and condemning meanness (Read, 1960). 
A !Kung grandmother most often takes on the task of teaching hxaro, their formal system of 
exchange and mutual support. The very young child is given beads and told which kinsmen to 




pass them on to (Bakeman, Adamson, Konner, & Barr,1990)7. It is certainly the case that 
sharing—especially of food—is a core value in most societies (Mauss, 1967) and children are 
hastened into compliance. But a related goal in “humanizing the child” is to make him/her as 
attractive as possible to alloparents or foster parents.  
Once again this behavior falls short of the criteria I have outlined that define teaching. 
There’s considerable evidence that children will learn the appropriate pro-social behaviors with 
time (d’Andrade, 1984; Fehr et al. 2008)8 including proper kin terms (Beverly & Whittemore, 
1993). For example, on Samoa (where rank and etiquette are important):  
Children as young as six…begin to pick up the distinctive features characterizing 
people of rank and authority without any explicit instruction. This was 
particularly the case for distinctive behavioral aspects of common ritual events 
associated with chiefs that children could readily witness (Odden & Rochat, 2004, 
p. 46). 
 
So there’s a cluster of teaching or quasi-teaching practices that are designed to accelerate 
the child’s independence from mother’s care and ensure that the child is tolerated and given 
alloparental care by other family and community members. A second cluster relates to a critical 
element in Gergely and associates’ theory. Csibra & Gergely (2011) argue that there is a great 
deal of the culture that is opaque. They give the following example: 
 
                                            
7 Like other hunter-gatherers, the !Kung are “fierce egalitarians.” They “consider refusal to share as the ‘ultimate 
sin’” (Howell 2010: 194). 
8 Recent laboratory studies underscore that human children exhibit pro-social behavior spontaneously from the age 
of three or earlier and are more readily pro-social than juvenile chimps (House et al. 2012). 




Imagine that you…observe a man as he turns a bottle upside down, twists its cap 
three times to the left and then another time to the right, turns it upside again, then 
opens it and drinks its content. (Csibra & Gergely, 2011, p. 1149) 
 
They argue that social learning alone would be insufficient, or at least inefficient, in 
figuring out the bottle-opening sequence. But what can we learn from their example? First, 
Csibra & Gergely seem to be ignoring the work by Keil and colleagues (Keil, 2006 see also Ruiz 
and Santos 2014) with WEIRD subjects that reveal the obvious fact that opacity per se is no 
obstacle to learning to use a myriad of common devices from locks to zippers. In the bottle 
opening example, all the learner must do is carefully observe the procedure then replicate it. No 
explicit, conscious instructional  demonstration is required. Nor would a lecture on the procedure 
and its necessity unless the whole exercise is a case of “functionless pedantry” (Mead, 1964). 
Second, in the real world of the village, completely opaque processes that are essential for 
children to learn are almost non-existent. In both ethnographic and historical accounts, we see 
children gaining virtually complete access to all aspects of the society. Children are not 
prohibited from “dangerous” situations. They may eavesdrop on adult conversation and 
interaction, including sex. In a butchering party, a five- year-old has his hands buried in the guts 
of the animal. Children are ubiquitous as spectators at court, funerals, rituals, marital conflicts, 
etc. Further, when one inventories the tools and processes involved in each society’s adaptation 
to their environment, this technology is inevitably quite uncomplicated and easily broken down 
into visible and comprehensible components (Oswalt, 1976; Whiten & Milner, 1984). After all, 
villagers don’t use multi-part food processors in meal preparation, combines to harvest their 
crops, or magnetic resonance imaging to diagnose their illnesses. Far from being opaque, pre-
modern societies are characterized by transparency. This is in stark contrast to post-industrial 




society where  “Multiple surveys of children’s understanding of work shows great naiveté and 
ignorance. Because they have little opportunity to observe different kinds of work, the whole 
subject is opaque” (Dunn 1988:309). 
Lastly, the twist-off bottle cap is a modern, WEIRD artifact, hardly the sort of tool found 
in the Paleolithic tool kit and, hence a very poor example..  
On the other hand, Gergely and associates are certainly correct in linking opacity to 
instruction. I have found only a few cases in the ethnographic literature of this necessity. The 
best known is the explicit, lesson-based instruction necessary to train a long-distance navigator in 
the Puluwat Islands. So complex and opaque is their navigation system that it must be explicitly 
taught to the novice by an expert. But note that on the entire island there are only a very few 
expert navigators, so an outsider might well live on Puluwat several years without actually 
witnessing such training. Further, on Puluwat, short-distance navigation and outrigger canoe 
construction are so completely transparent, no instruction is necessary (Gladwin, 1970). Among 
the Yoruba, and undoubtedly many other societies, the skills and knowledge of ritual 
practitioners, such as Ifá diviners, are hidden and only taught to a select, gifted few (Bascom, 
1969; see also the Kogi priesthood, cf Reichel–Dolmatoff, 1976). This is a pretty paltry sample 
to build a case for the evolutionary imperative of teaching. These few cases of teaching certainly 
illustrate the human capacity to create lessons, but they leave open the following critical 
questions: 
Is it possible to analytically extract some “teaching essence” that is only deployed during 
a lesson? Or to put it differently, is the conduct of lessons dependent on some key skill or 
behavior that is not used in other interactional settings (e.g. speech, shared intentionality) nor 
routinely displayed in non-human primates. If this challenge proves impossible, then we’re left 




without the empirical tools (e.g. operational definition) to even begin a test of teaching as an 
evolved suite of unique skills.  
Another essential set of components implied by a proposed evolutionary theory would 
relate to fitness. We should expect to see teaching occurring where there is a body of knowledge 
and/or specific skills which children cannot acquire on their own and where, lacking them, their 
fitness (survivorship, reproduction) is severely impaired. No proponent of teaching as the engine 
of culture transmission has even raised this question, let alone tested it. From my extensive 
survey of the literature, this hypothesis cannot be sustained. I have found only one prototypical 
case. The Fort Norman Slave band of Inuit hunts during severe winter weather and must traverse 
ice-fields. Fathers “instruct” sons about this dangerous environment (which comprises 13 kinds 
of ice and multiple modes of travel) via a game-like quiz (Basso, 1972). But one can find similar 
examples of apparently opaque knowledge—Siberian hunters’ mastery of their challenging 
environment—where teaching is not considered useful because “to be a hunter you must know 
everything yourself”  (Willerslev, 2007, p. 160).  In other words, despite the challenges of 
navigating the arctic landscape, not all societies that must do so consider it essential to teach 
(Geary, 2000) their novices such as hunters and reindeer herders (Istomin & Dwyer, 2009). 
Given the theory, one can speculate on where we might find critical skills that are, 
because of complexity and opaqueness, candidates for deliberate instruction. Prime candidates 
would be hunting and fishing. Here is a suite of skills that improve both individual fitness and 
that of one’s family and community. A “good” hunter/fisher who shares his bounty of scarce 
protein is considered an excellent “mate,” and empirical studies have demonstrated that more 
successful hunters have increased opportunities for extra-marital mating, thereby increasing their 
inclusive fitness (Hawkes, 1991). From the theory (“a basic cognitive hominin adaptation,” 




Csibra & Gergely 2009, p. 149), one might expect that virtually all boys in a society where 
hunting or fishing contributed to the diet would be “taught” to hunt and/or fish.  
A very thorough review of the ethnographic record shows the near total absence of 
“lessons” in which fathers/adults teach young boys to hunt. “Much of the [young Penan’s] 
expertise will be gained through trial and error experience in play or while actually hunting, not 
by direct instruction” (Puri, 2005, p. 281). “Ju/wasi hunters maintain that hunting is not 
something that one teaches…You have to teach yourself” (Liebenberg, 1990, p. 70). In fact, 
unlike other forms of work where social learning from adults is the norm, with hunting (and 
fishing in some cases as well, e.g. Lancy, 2014), boys are prevented from accompanying hunters, 
so opportunities to observe experts’ hunting skills and acquire knowledge of prey are limited. 
Children are left behind on the hunt because they are noisy, slow, and impatient (Martu  – Bird & 
Bliege Bird, 2005; !Kung  –  Howell, 2010; Penan, Puri, 2005; Yora – Sugiyama & Chacon, 
2005). Aka boys rarely are in the company of men hunting (their primary contribution to 
subsistence) because hunting is best done solo (Boyette, 2013).  Among the Huaorani, “hunting 
is performed more efficiently alone” (Rival, 2002, p. 102).   
 Nevertheless, on their own or with peers, boys can begin to learn hunting/trapping quite 
early—targeting small creatures (which would be spurned by adult hunters) and practicing their 
tracking and capture skills for hours each day (Apache – Goodwin & Goodwin, 1942; Baka – 
Higgens, 1985; Hadza – Crittenden, Conklin–Brittain, Zes, Schoeninger, & Marlowe, 
2013; !Kung – Shostak, 1981;  Asbano-Little, 2011). While adult role models may not be 
available, older brothers seem quite happy to show off their skills to impress their juniors (Little, 
2011; Biyaka–Neuwelt-Truntzer, 1981; Puri, 2005). There is an extremely relevant body of 
research that supports the notion that children are “natural” foragers and do not need to be taught 
or even shown how it’s done (Chipeniuk, 1995; Heth & Cornell, 1985; Hunn, 2002; Piel, 2012; 




Zarger, 2002). And boys are free to listen and learn as “real” hunters recount their experiences 
back in the village after the hunt (Liebenberg, 1990; Tayanin & Lindell, 1991). Nevertheless, the 
hunters have no pedantic intent and make no adjustment for the rudimentary knowledge of the 
aspirant hunters (Yukaghir – Willerslev, 2007).  
A parallel could easily be drawn between girls and craftwork. If certain crafts (weaving, 
pottery, basketry) provide essential community needs, and if competence in those crafts marks a 
young woman as “ready” to assume the responsibilities of wife and mother, then teaching should 
be essential to ensure that all achieve the necessary level of competence. But again we find many 
more cases of children becoming competent crafts-persons without the aid of instruction than the 
reverse (Lancy, 2014a; Crown, 2002). Perhaps even more common are societies where 
“pathways to learning vary significantly”—some less expert crafts-persons seeking and getting 
assistance from those more expert while others progress without seeking assistance (Puri, 2013, 
p. 293). The Shipbo-Conibo peoples of the Amazon Basin are a good case in point. The 
socialization (including teaching) of young potters leads to a “bewildering variety of…designs” 
(DeBoer, 1990, p. 88). So, contrary to the assertion made by Kline (2015) and others that 
teaching is essential to the “faithful” transmission of culture, clear evidence of teaching of 
Shipbo Conibo novice potters does not result in the faithful and conservative transmission of 
culture.  In addition to stylistic variation, skill levels vary widely, suggesting that mothers do not 
carry out lessons designed reliably to bring the novice to a state of mastery or at least clear 
competence. Indeed, “there are scandalous cases of Shipbo-Conibo women who never become 
good, or even adequate artists” (DeBoer, 1990, p. 88). 
In short, proponents have argued that teaching evolved as a unique cognitive adaptation 
to ensure that critical, fitness-enhancing skills—which could not be acquired solely through 
social learning—would be learned by aspirant practioners. Proponents must, therefore, be able to 




identify prototypical domains or a suite of skills that would be very likely to provoke a teaching 
response. I have supplied two prototypes for them—hunting and craftwork—and showed (see 
also Lancy, 2014a, in press b) that, by and large, boys learn to hunt without the benefit of a 
teacher or even an adult role model, and boys and girls typically master critical craft production 
without direct instruction. This scattered and scarce distribution of culturally sanctioned and 
routinized applications of instruction in the rearing of children fatally undermines any claim that 
there is an evolutionary imperative for “natural pedagogy.” 
“Good” Teachers, “Good” Pupils? 
If teaching is vital and universal, we should find the majority of adults considered “good” 
teachers and children “good” pupils. Assuming, for the sake of argument, that everyone is born 
with a suite of cognitive traits and the explicit motivation and determination “to facilitate 
learning in others” (Kline 2015, p. 6 , emphasis in original), then we might expect to see the 
majority of the adult population acting eagerly and willingly as teachers9. On average, they 
should be “good at it.” By the same token, children should gravitate readily to the role of pupil 
and automatically display appropriate behaviors in order to benefit from the lessons. Again, the 
majority should exhibit considerable native ability to learn from an instructor.  
On the subject of “natural teachers,” cases that illustrate careful, informed, systematic 
Vygotskian-style scaffolded instruction are virtually non-existent before the modern era. Even in 
formal apprenticeship, one isn’t likely to see much teaching—by anyone’s definition (Lancy, 
2012). In fact there are probably more descriptions in the ethnographic record of experts 
                                            
9 One piece of contrafactual evidence for this statement is the frequency with which ethnographers complain about 
their informants’ unwillingness to assist them in learning the culture–subsistence skills in particular. Indeed, 
villagers see the inept attempts of the ethnographer and his/her social faux pas as occasions for hilarity and 
entertainment, not instruction (Henze, 1992; Nicolaisen, 1988). 




spurning overtures from would-be novices/pupils than of the reverse (Edwards, 2005; Gladwin & 
Sarason, 1953; Hill & Plath, 1998; Krause, 1985; Lancy, 1996; Reichard, 1934). Even more 
common in the ethnographic record are broader, normative statements made by both adults and 
children that assert the absence of teaching in cultural transmission; its superfluity; even its 
capacity to harm and undermine a child’s self-initiated learning—a finding affirmed in recent 
experimental psychological research (Bonawitz et al., 2011). A sample of such statements can be 
found in Table 1.  
When observing the junior member of the teacher/pupil partnership, the picture is similar. 
Camilla Morelli (2011, 2012) has been a recent participant observer—with a focus on children—
in a transitional community of Matses Indians in the Peruvian Amazon. She marvels at how 
facile and active the Matses children are in the natural environment compared to her own 
feelings of ineptitude. She is cowed by three- and four-year-olds who competently paddle and 
maneuver canoes on the wide river. She observes young boys nimbly catching and handling 
enormous catfish. And then she is struck by the painful contrast between the children’s mastery 
of their natural surroundings while displaying great discomfort and incompetence in the 
classroom. She summarizes the dilemma as “learning to sit still.” Somehow, Matses children 
must suppress their spontaneous inclinations, which serve them well in learning their culture, and 
adopt a pattern of behavior and cognitive engagement that is completely novel. Matses children 
are active, hands-on learners; their role models are other children, not their parents. The learning 
process is profoundly physical rather than verbal. When free to learn on their own they are 
contented; constrained to learn from a teacher, they are restless and frustrated.  
 Natural Pedagogy in the Classroom 
“Natural pedagogy” should also have been in full view as schools were introduced to rural 
communities that had never encountered formal education—assuming of course that Gergely and 




associates acknowledge that natural pedagogy should apply in the school as well as the home. 
But, in a well-known series of monographs sponsored by the anthropology of education program 
at Stanford (Spindler & Spindler, 1983), ethnographers portrayed village classroom scenes that 
were painful to observe. Children were treated cruelly. For instance, in the schools in the Chiapas 
Highlands of Mexico, students were beaten and made to kneel on pebbles or fruit pits to drive 
lessons home. It is no wonder that “Indian parents did all they could to save their children from 
the terrible fate of attending school” (Modiano, 1973, p. 87). In the 1960s, John Gay, Michael 
Cole (Gay & Cole, 1967) and I (Lancy, 1975) observed Kpelle village classrooms where teachers 
behaved like automatons, completely unable to adapt the to-be-learned material to the skill level, 
language, prior knowledge, or comprehension of the students. The most frequently used 
“instructional aide” was some form of physical punishment or verbal chastisement (Rival, 2002) 
10 and these pedagogical tactics may be endorsed by parents in some societies (Wolf, 1972). 
Students weren’t learning much from the constant rounds of rote memorization and repetition of 
the teacher’s words, and ended up leaving school long before they’d learned enough to use 
schooling as a passport into salaried employment. Mead refers to “functionless pedantry” (Mead, 
1964) where the learner is subjected to teaching not for the content or skill transmitted, but to 
assert the “teacher’s” dominant status11.  Rural schools have been a colossal failure on a world-
wide scale, at least in part because the principal players don’t know how to enact the roles of 
teacher and student. 
                                            
10 In rural Morocco, beating as a form of “instruction” is still accepted at home and in school (Nutter-El Ouardani 
2013: 115). 
11 For a review of “functionless pedantry” in adolescent initiation rites, see (Lancy 2014 a: 334-336). Similarly, 
“the Romans used education…to reproduce social hierarchies within their own society…the political function of 
pedagogy is…easily disguised…” (Corbeill 2001: 282). 





Aside from seeking evidence of natural pedagogy in the behavior of classroom teachers, the 
theory should predict that children or novices will take on the role of pupil easily. They should 
demonstrate a willingness to comply with the teacher and collaborate to the extent, for example, 
of asking questions of the teacher when they can’t understand the lesson. But we see precisely 
the opposite. We see “pupils” in classrooms fretting at the inactivity (Morelli, 2011) and at 
having to focus on listening to a teacher (Paradise & de Haan, 2009) when they’re accustomed to 
learning through doing. “The child keeps on doing and doing, and then gets used to it [is an 
expression] very often used [by Tapajós Indians] to talk about the learning process” (Medaets, 
2011, p. 4). Yukaghir (Siberian foragers) model of knowledge transferal could be described as 
“doing is learning and learning is doing” (Willerslev, 2007, p. 162). With respect to the pupil 
asking questions of the teacher, the descriptions in Table 3 are representative12: 
 These village norms have real consequences in terms of the mindset children bring to the 
classroom, as demonstrated in an ingenious experiment. Mayan children were compared with 
middle-class American counterparts in an origami-folding task. The village-reared children were 
much more attentive to the demonstration and to the activities of others in the setting, especially 
adults. Unlike the Anglo children, they did not seek additional information to aid them in 
completing the task (Correa–Chavez & Rogoff, 2005)13. Parallel results were observed in a study 
                                            
12 In my study of Kpelle childhood (Lancy 1996), my best informant was a child who was not at all intimidated by 
me, was very talkative and articulate, and quite perceptive. I was repeatedly warned by adults to keep my distance 
from this child as he was a rascal and “not a proper Kpelle child.” 
13 In a parallel study in the US, groups of children whose immigrant mothers were relatively well or poorly 
educated, behaved differently when shown how to make origami figures. The latter group relied solely on 
observation whereas the former sought additional information through questioning the teacher (Mejia–Arauz et al. 
2005).  




comparing native Hawaiian and Haole (Anglo) students where the latter were much more likely 
to request adult assistance, and consequently were more successful at the task (Gallimore, 
Howard, & Jordan, 1969). 
The First Schools 
There is little evidence that schooling in the village has changed a great deal in the intervening 
50 years since the anthropology of education field was launched (Shepler, 2014). In fact, when 
West African education authorities attempt to “modernize” (e.g., to abandon “natural” pedagogy) 
teaching methods in village classrooms, they are met with resistance on the part of teachers and 
parents (Anderson-Levitt & Diallo, 2003; Moore, 2006). Specifically with respect to corporal 
punishment, teachers in Guinea echo a widely expressed view: “Il faut suffrir pour apprendre” = 
to learn one must suffer” (Anderson–Levitt, 2005, p. 988). 
To check any tendency the reader might have to find some bias or inaccuracy in this 
portrait of teaching, a review of the historical record will readily show that what is today 
considered effective pedagogy was also absent from the first few millennia of formal education.  
“Literate and numerate education, characteristic of the Eastern Palace cultures [dating] to 
3200BCE [was] developed to train a scribal class in service to a centralized monarchy” (Langdon, 
2013, p. 446). The oldest known classroom and pedagogical material were found in 
Mesopotamia. The edduba (Tablet House) from the third millennium BCE, excavated at Mari, 
had two rows of benches for the students and many discarded clay tablets. The clay tablet 
facilitated instruction because it could be easily erased and reused, and was much less costly than 
the writing media used elsewhere in antiquity. Sumerian scholar Samuel Kramer notes—from a 
reading of the ancient texts—that the schools were “uninviting,” the lessons were dull and 
discipline was harsh (1963, p. 243). One poor novice describes his experience: “My headmaster 




read my tablet, said: ‘There is something missing,’ caned14 me. ‘Why didn’t you speak 
Sumerian,’ caned me. My teacher said: ‘Your hand is unsatisfactory,’ caned me. And so I began 
to hate the scribal art” (Kramer, 1963, pp. 238–239).  
This unpromising regimen changes little through the ages (Chiappetta, 1953). And 
evidence of the conflict between top-down teaching and bottom-up learners is not hard to find. 
“Graffiti at Pompeii reveals the children …mocking their school learning” (Bloomer, 2013, p. 
453). And, “a common writing exercise had the student write ‘work hard lest you be beaten’” 
(Bloomer, 2013, p. 455). In Britain the master is depicted perched at his elevated desk “grasping 
the birch—a bundle of twigs—that formed his badge of office” and used “to punish indiscipline 
and inability to answer” (Orme, 2006, p. 144). A teacher in the 1590s “laments that children are 
afraid to come to school and wish to leave as soon as possible because of the severity and 
frequency of the whippings” (Durantini, 1983, p. 125). These practices grew out of the belief that 
children would not naturally accept the role of pupil. In Holland in the 17th century, children’s 
resistance to pedagogical practices was so widely acknowledged that it spawned an entire genre 
of painting—“unruly school scenes” (Durantini, 1983, pp. 152-4). 
Teaching in the Present and Future 
Ironically, even in WEIRD society, where parental teaching is practically a sacred duty, parents 
and professionally trained teachers aren’t necessarily very good at it. In a study of WEIRD 
parents teaching their children the game Chutes and Ladders, some parents used effective 
techniques, other were quite ineffective (Bjorklund, 2007; see also Bergin, Lancy, & Draper, 
1994). In a recent massive study in the US (Robinson & Harris, 2014), the level of parents’ 
academic involvement did not predict children’s grades. In fact, “helping with homework” had a 
negative impact because parents lacked appropriate knowledge and/or teaching skills and 
                                            
14 The specific cuneiform sign for “caned” is an amalgam of the signs for stick and flesh (Kramer 1963: 237). 




students were more successful on their own.  The main thrust of this study is that the “parent 
involvement” mantra is based on the myth that all parents are effective teachers. But. in fact, 
from the earliest teachers in the first schools to the unhelpful homework tutors, a common 
element is the employment of  “controlling teaching techniques, such as commands and 
corrections…shown to negatively affect a number of child learning outcomes including 
conceptual understanding and task performance” (Reeve 2009, p. 160). 
The parent involvement campaign has, as a primary goal, the recruiting of parents—
typically lower or working class—as auxiliary teachers. But these parents, historically, disavow 
any interest in teaching their children or taking responsibility for their successful schooling. 
These aren’t neglectful parents, but modern adherents of the village-based socialization model. 
For example, Lareau (see also Kusserow, 2004) found that working class children “have more 
autonomy from adults than their middle-class counterparts” (Lareau, 2003, p. 151).  
The linguistic anthropologist Shirley Brice Heath conducted a long-term ethnographic 
project with families in the Piedmont region of the US in the 1970s. Her goal was to understand 
how different communities interact with literacy, especially where children were concerned. In a 
poor, African-American community, “Tracton,” use of books (other than the Bible) and printed 
material was limited, and parents did not engage in elaborate conversations or other “joint 
activity” with their young children, nor did they see it as their responsibility to act as the child’s 
first teacher. She recorded sentiments that echo those recorded by anthropologists in villages 
throughout the world.  
He [her grandson] gotta learn to know ’bout dis world, can’t nobody tell ’im. Now 
just how crazy is dat? White folks uh hear dey kids say sump’n, dey say it back 
to ’em, dey aks ’em ’gain ’n ’gain ’bout things…He just gotta be keen, keep his 
eyes open…Gotta watch hisself by watchin’ other folks. Ain’t no use me 




tellin’ ’im: “learn dis, learn dat”…He just gotta learn…he see one thing one place 
one time, he know how it go, see sump’n like it again, maybe it be same, maybe it 
won’t. He hafta try it out (Heath, 1983, p. 84). 
 
The very same philosophy was displayed in Dicken’s 1836 classic The Pickwick Papers. 
The Pickwickians had taken on Sam Weller as general manager and all-around assistant to 
support their peregrinations through England. When Pickwick meets Sam’s father, they have this 
interchange: 
“Beg your pardon, sir,” said Mr. Weller senior, taking off his hat, “I hope you’re no fault 
to find with Sammy sir?” “None whatsoever,” said Mr. Pickwick. “Why very glad to hear 
it, sir,” replied the old man; “I took a good deal o’ pains with his eddication, sir; let him 
run in the streets when he was very young, and shift for hisself.  It’s the only way to 
make a boy sharp, sir.” (p. 306 in 1964 edition.) 
 
Lareau’s cross-class comparative ethnography identifies similar attitudes in a typical US 
working-class community. For instance, Mrs. Morris, a mother from Colton, saw her son 
Tommy’s education beginning when she “turned over responsibility” for him to the school. 
Afterwards, she remained largely in ignorance of his progress and was surprised to be called to 
the school and informed that he was doing poorly (Lareau, 1989). Each of these studies of 
contemporary parenting practices outside WEIRD society reinforces my argument that teaching 
by parents is cultural, not natural. And further, that the skills involved are not learned easily 
(Geary, 1995). 




If teaching was rare and patchy in the past and across cultures, then what has led to the 
unquestioned dominance of teaching as the essential means of child rearing and cultural 
transmission? 
 
The requirement of out-of-context, or context-independent, learning makes formal 
schooling an evolutionarily novel and “unnatural” experience... Children did not 
evolve to sit quietly at desks in age-segregated classrooms being instructed by 
unrelated and unfamiliar adults. Yet such procedures, to varying degrees, are 
necessary. They are necessary because the demands of modern culture required 
that children master basic technological skills, the most important of which are 
reading and writing, and mathematics, as well as knowledge in a broad realm of 
domains (Bjorklund, 2007, p. 120). 
 
In pre-modern, face-to-face communities, skills and knowledge that are both critical and 
opaque are rare to non-existent. In post-industrial societies, opaque material that is essential for 
young learners to acquire fills entire libraries. The sheer volume is enormous and growing 
exponentially.  An entire system of instruction has been invented over years to handle this 
massive challenge in cultural transmission. In WEIRD society, infants are subject to early 
lessons from conscientious and attendant parents and, not surprisingly, they become precocious 
teachers themselves15 (Strauss & Ziv, 2012). Nevertheless, despite spending billions on 
developing curricula, methods, and teacher training, the schooling process, at least across much 
                                            
15 My daughter Nadia is nearly two years older than her younger sibling Sonia. For years, but especially before they 
started school, there was a constant running conflict between Nadia’s felt “need” to “teach” her sister and Sonia’s 
personal imperative to learn on her own.  




of the US, seems, by many measures, seriously deficient. There seems to be very little that is 
“natural” about effective pedagogy. On the contrary, promoting successful pedagogy seems like 
an engineering challenge comparable to sending humans to the moon.  
Conclusion 
I would propose that the arguments which attempt to elevate teaching to a privileged place in 
human evolutionary theory are doomed to fail. I believe that a far more fruitful discussion might 
center on reconsidering the degree to which childhood should be considered a period of 
dependency (Kramer, 2014). I believe that contemporary thinking across the social sciences and 
biology may over-estimate the degree of dependency during the sub-adult period. Thinking is 
colored by three factors. First: the pervasive effects of living in a Neontocracy (Lancy, 1996, 
2014) where youth are almost totally dependent on others well into adolescence. Second: the 
early !Kung reports which initially defined the “ancestral” analog. But !Kung children are unable 
to contribute much to subsistence—which is highly unusual. And third: the very evident 
dependency of infants who are truly helpless. Once we open this debate, we might begin to 
entertain the idea that, while children do learn from others, especially parents, they are the active 
and leading partners in this enterprise; and that parents are passive and even reluctant partners 
(see Gray, this volume; Toub et al., this volume). If this view prevails, then “teaching” might be 
placed in the marginal position in theory that it occupies in reality. 
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Table 1: Evidence of an anti-teaching philosophy 
[On Truk Island, there is no] “’training’” of children in our sense” (Bollig, 1927, p. 96). 
“During this period there is no formal training [among the Mbuti Pygmies], but boys and girls alike learn all there is 
to be learned by simple emulation and by assisting their parents and elders in various tasks” (Turnbull, 1965, p. 
179). 
“No formal instruction is practiced among the [!Kung]…learning…comes from the children’s observation of the 
more experienced” (Marshall, 1958, p. 51). 
[Among the reindeer-herding Saami of Norway], “the child…is not instructed before starting a project, nor does he 
solicit help” (Anderson, 1978, p. 194).  
[There] “is remarkably little meddling by older [Inuit] people in the learning process. Parents do not presume to 
teach their children what they can as easily learn on their own” (Guemple, 1979, p. 50). 
“In contrast to American parents, who seem to feel that knowledge is something like medicine—it’s good for the 
child and must be crammed down his throat even if he does not like it—Rotuman parents acted as if learning were 
inevitable because the child wants to learn” (Howard, 1970, p. 37, emphasis added). 
Nyaka [foragers from the Lake Nyassa region of Southern India] “parents do not feel the need to ‘socialize’ their 
children and do not believe that parents’ activities greatly affect their children’s development” (Hewlett & Lamb 
2005, p. 10). “Young [Nyaka] people learn their skills from direct experience, in the company of other children or 
other adults” (Bird-David, 2005, p. 96).  
Kenyan Gusii “mothers…expect…their infants and toddlers to comply with their wishes…they could be harsh [and] 
rarely praised their infants or asked them questions, but tended to issue commands and threats in communicating 
with them” (LeVine, 2004, p. 156). 
[Manus] “children accompany their parents and participate in adult activities that involve little skill. No attempt is 
made to develop skills—the emphasis is rather on the easy, pleasant identification with the activities of adults” 
(Mead, 1964, p. 57). 
“If one asks a Chaga [from Tanzania] where he got his knowledge, in nine cases out of ten, the reply is: ‘From 
nobody; I taught it myself!’” (Raum, 1940, pp. 246-7). 
The Chewong of Malaysia believe that “…a child will grow and develop without specific parental interference” 
(Howell, 1988, p. 162).   




Table 1 continued 
“To say that [Matsigenka] children learn from their parents does not imply that they receive much in the way of 
instruction. Children are given freedom to watch and imitate parents with minimal interference. Orna and I, in trying 
to learn many elemental skills like cooking over an open fire or walking on mountain trails, received virtually no 
advice or instruction; people watched us founder without showing us how it is done” (Johnson, 2003, p. 111). 
“Copying, and trial and error, rather than explicit teaching, are certainly the methods by which Duna men learn 
about flaked stone” (White, Modjeska, & Hipuya, 1977, p. 381).” 
 
  




Table 2 Components of a Definition of Teaching 
The teacher must incur costs (taking time away from their work or using non-recoverable materials) and these 
“costs to teachers of facilitating learning are outweighed by the long-term fitness benefits they accrue once 
pupils have learned” (Thornton & Raihani, 2008, p. 1823).  
Teaching will not occur, or is unlikely, where the learner is able to acquire the requisite knowledge or skill in 
the absence of teaching (Thornton & Raihani 2008). 
Teaching involves the intent of the teacher to alter/enhance the knowledge or competence of the learner. The 
learner is aware of the teacher’s intention and engages with or attends to the “lesson” (Olson, 2009). 
Teachers explicitly monitor the progress of the learner and modify teaching activity accordingly (Kruger & 
Tomasello, 1996).   
 
  




Table  3: How novices are expected to behave 
“In a Mayan community…children are taught to avoid challenging an adult with a display of greater knowledge 
by telling them something” (Rogoff, 1990, p. 60). 
On an Indian Reservation in the US, children are viewed as being inattentive because they don’t gaze at the 
teacher when she is speaking; yet averting one’s gaze in the presence of adults is “proper” behavior in the 
village (Phillips, 1983).   
West African Wolof parents never quiz their kids by asking known-answer questions (Irvine, 1978).  
Fijian children are never encouraged to address adults or even to make eye contact. Rather, their demeanor 
should express timidity and self-effacement (Toren, 1990). 
Were the Mazahua children to ask questions it would be considered immature and rude (Paradise & Rogoff, 
2009; see also Penn, 2001). 
“Because Inuit children are present in many multi-age situations, they are exposed to a great deal of 
talk by older people. Yet, it became apparent in this study that they were neither expected to 
participate nor to ask questions of adults who were speaking together. If they did ask questions, the 
adults ignored them, leaving their questions unanswered” (Crago, 1992, p. 494). 
In a Tongan classroom, teachers may well expect students to volunteer information, ask questions, or eagerly 
answer the teacher’s academic questions. This doesn’t happen though because, in a Tongan village, children are 
to learn through observation alone (Morton, 1996).  
In a four-culture (Samoa, Caribbean, Nepal, Kenya) comparative study, children very rarely asked information-
seeking questions. Parents did not engage in dialog with their children to exchange information. They were to 
be obedient, respectful and responsible (Gauvain & Munroe, 2013).  
Tizard and Hughes (1984) showed that middle class preschoolers asked more questions than lower class. 
Middle class parents consistently asked and received more questions/answers than lower class. Middle class 
parents are more likely to take up, repeat, or expand what the child has just said. Parents who didn’t pose or 
solicit questions were much more likely to use commands or directives with children.   
 
 
